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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
A CRITIQUE OF GERS: 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND 
REVENUE IN SCOTLAND 
by Jim Cuthbert and Margaret Cuthbert 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper represents a critique of the 
government's published report on 
"Government Expenditure and Revenue in 
Scotland", (commonly referred to as GERS). 
There are, in fact, two levels at which such a 
critique might be approached. The first is 
primarily philosophical, and would be 
concerned with fundamental questions such as 
"what is the purpose of a GERS exercise and 
how relevant are the results to different time 
periods or constitutional arrangements?" The 
second is concerned primarily with practical 
issues: notably the adequacy of the 
methodology used and the accuracy of data 
sources. 
In the main, this paper deals with the second 
level of approach, although we return briefly 
in the final section to consider more 
philosophical issues. 
The GERS report intends, "to provide a 
strictly factual contribution to public 
understanding of the budgetary issues in 
Scotland. The report examines circumstances 
and data, using a methodology which is 
analytically sound and which can be clearly 
explained". Our conclusions, based on analysis 
of publicly available data, are that it does not 
achieve this objective. The existing 
methodology is in certain respects flawed; the 
data sources are in many cases inadequate. 
Leaving aside philosophical issues, and 
concentrating only on practicalities, there are a 
number of points which require to be 
addressed before confidence can be placed in 
the estimation of a general government 
borrowing requirement for Scotland. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The 
first section provides background information 
on GERS, and also on die key source 
document, the Financial Statement and Budget 
Report (FSBR), which sets out expenditures, 
revenues and borrowing requirement at the UK 
level. The next two sections give a critique of 
the techniques used in GERS on the revenue 
and expenditure side respectively. There then 
follows a section which looks specifically at 
the important topic of European funded 
expenditure and the handling of European 
receipts. The final section sums up the 
findings, states the conclusions of the work, 
and puts forward suggestions of what is now 
necessary to improve information on 
Scotland's public finances; it also raises some 
of the philosophical issues concerning the 
production of a GGBR for Scotland: by and 
large, mese philosophical issues are every bit 
as important as the practical issues raised in 
this paper. 
BACKGROUND 
The GERS report is concerned with an 
analysis of the public finances in Scotland, and 
within it, it includes the calculation of the 
General Government Borrowing Requirement 
(GGBR) for Scotland. "General Government" 
denotes the combined central government and 
local authorities sectors. General Government 
Expenditure is a National Accounts concept 
and is the combined expenditure of the two 
sectors, excluding payments between them. 
GERS defines the GGBR for Scotland as the 
difference between General Government 
Expenditure (defined to exclude privatisation 
proceeds) and General Government Receipts 
(GGR), (defined to exclude North Sea Oil 
Revenues). To date the exercise has been 
carried out five times since 1992. The latest 
report is for 1996-97, and was published in 
November 1998. 
To a large extent GERS is an attempt to 
provide at Scotland level the counterpart of the 
calculation of the GGBR at UK level in the 
Financial Statement and Budget Report 
(FSBR).1 
For 1996-97, the FSBR recorded the Outturns 
as follows: 
1
 The latter records the GGBR as the 
difference between GGE (inclusive of 
privatisation proceeds) and GGR where GGR 
includes North Sea Oil revenues. 
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UK £ Billion 
General Government 
Expenditure 
General Government Receipts 
General Government Borrowing 
Requirement 
1996-97 
309.0 
286.3 
22.7 
Note that this snapshot or static view of 
general government transactions is insufficient 
in itself to say much about the state of general 
government finances. The dynamics of the 
situation are of importance, as also are 
indicators such as the level of general 
government debt and of the public sector's net 
wealth. The FSBR contains information on 
these aspects. As the FSBR indicates, for most 
of the 1980s and 1990s the current balance 
(the difference between government receipts 
and current spending) for the UK has been in 
substantial deficit. The gross general 
government debt (the Maastricht measure) has 
risen steeply over the past five years from 34% 
to 55% of GDP. At the same time, the public 
sector's assets have fallen with privatisation 
and low levels of public investment With the 
debt burden also rising, the public sector's net 
wealth has fallen steeply from around 70% of 
GDP during the 1980s to an estimated 10% of 
GDP at end 1996. 
An aspect of the FSBR, which is important, is 
its treatment of payments to and from the 
European Union. There is nothing in writing, 
which says how the FSBR handles these 
European transactions. The Treasury has 
however confirmed that at the UK level, the 
relevant figures are included in the FSBR on a 
net basis. On the expenditure side, implicit in 
the figures are terms for expenditure on UK's 
net contribution to Europe plus expenditure 
directly funded by European receipts. Apart 
from timing effects, the sum of these two items 
equals the UK's gross contribution to Europe. 
There is no term on the revenue side 
representing receipts from Europe. 
The other possible approach would have been 
a gross treatment. This would have included 
on the expenditure side the UK's gross 
contribution to Europe and expenditure in the 
UK on projects funded by European receipts: 
on the revenue side would appear receipts 
from Europe. At the UK level, the net 
treatment and the gross treatment have the 
same result on the GGBR. 
GERS: REVENUES 
Introduction 
General government receipts for the UK for 
1996-97 (outturn), as presented in the FSBR, 
1997 are shown in the table below: 
Income tax 
Corporation tax 
Value added tax 
Excise duties1 
Other taxes and 
royalties2 
Social security 
contributions 
Other receipts 
General 
Government 
Receipts 
Outturn £ 
billion 
69.5 
27.7 
46.7 
30.6 
49.7 
47.4 
14.8 
2863 
Asa% 
of Total 
24.3 
9.7 
16.3 
10.7 
17.4 
16.6 
5.2 
100 
1. Fuel, alcohol and tobacco duties 
2. includes council tax and money paid 
into the National Lottery Distribution 
Fund, as well as other central 
government taxes. 
Source: Financial Statement and Budget 
Report 1997 
Data for the above are provided by 
Departments such as the Inland Revenue and 
Customs and Excise. Actual data for Scotland 
is in the main not available; the major 
exceptions being council tax and non-domestic 
rates. The following paragraphs outline the 
methods which have been used in GERS to 
obtain estimates for these taxes and detail 
some of the issues and problems which arise 
from the methods used. 
Income Tax 
Information on net income tax receipts is held 
by the Inland Revenue in such a way that it 
cannot be broken down into different countries 
in the UK. To break the figures down in order 
to give an estimate of net receipts of income 
tax for Scotland, GERS uses the Scottish share 
of UK income tax liability and applies this to 
UK net income tax receipts. So, for example, 
in 1996-97, the UK Survey of Personal 
Incomes estimated the Scottish share of UK 
income tax liability to be 8.0%. This share was 
applied in GERS to UK income tax net 
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receipts to obtain a figure of £5,500 million as 
being income tax raised in Scotland. 
There are two major criticisms of this. 
1. There are two surveys which give 
information on income tax: the 
Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI) and 
the DSS 1% Survey. Of the two 
surveys, the DSS 1% Survey is six 
times larger than the SPI survey. The 
DSS 1% survey concentrates on 
income from employment; while the 
SPI includes the self employed and 
other forms of income. 
GERS uses the SPI as it has a fuller 
coverage. However, it is possible to 
carry out a comparison of the results 
from the two surveys by looking at a 
large group covered by both; in other 
words comparing like with like. The 
two surveys can be directly compared 
on their estimates of the total of 
PAYE pay for Scotland: the 
comparison shows a 0.4 percentage 
point difference between the two 
surveys in their estimates of 
Scotland's total PAYE pay as a share 
of UK PAYE pay, with the DSS 
survey giving the higher estimate. 
The DSS is by far the larger sample; 
and this suggests that the SPI 
underestimates for Scotland. Given 
total income tax receipts for the UK, 
an underestimate of this magnitude 
would understate Scotland's income 
tax revenues by £270 million. 
2. There is a further major point - and 
that is that the distribution of income 
tax liability among the countries in 
the UK may be different from the 
distribution of net income tax 
receipts. There is indeed a very big 
difference between the total of 
income tax liabilities and the total of 
income tax receipts: for example in 
1995-96, income tax liabilities were 
£72 billion, gross income tax receipts 
were £82.5 billion and after income 
tax repayments of over £14 billion, 
net income tax receipts were £68 
billion. Given these very large 
differences, there is scope for the 
distribution of tax liabilities between 
the different parts of the UK to be 
quite different from the distribution of 
net income tax receipts. 
According to the Inland Revenue, the 
main reason for the difference 
between tax liabilities and tax receipts 
relates to tax credits on dividends. 
Individuals with dividend income 
receive a tax credit. The Inland 
Revenue includes this as part of the 
tax liabilities for UK individuals - but 
there is nothing corresponding to this 
in actual income tax receipts, (since 
the tax relating to the tax credit has 
already been received by the 
government as Advanced Corporation 
Tax). 
This implies that, the greater the 
amount of tax credit received by an 
individual, the greater the difference 
between his income tax liability and 
the income tax the government will 
actually receive from him. Given that 
investment income is higher per head, 
on average, in the rest of the UK 
compared to Scotland (Source: 
Regional Trends), the gap between 
tax liabilities and tax receipts is likely 
to be larger for the rest of the UK 
than it is for Scotland. In other words, 
Scotland's share of tax receipts will 
be higher than its share of tax 
liabilities. 
The GERS methodology, which 
estimates Scotland's share of tax 
receipts on the basis of its tax 
liabilities is therefore likely to 
underestimate Scotland's share of tax 
receipts. The size of the likely 
underestimate cannot be quantified. 
Social Security Contributions 
Social security contributions in the UK in 
1996-97 were £47.2 billion. An estimate of the 
amount attributable to Scotland was obtained 
by GERS with reference to the 1% DSS 
sample of National Insurance records. In 1995-
96, this survey indicated that Scotland had a 
9% share of UK National Insurance 
contributions (employees and employers); 
GERS for 1995-96 used a factor of 8.6%. This 
year GERS records a 9% share for 1996-97. 
Either GERS was in error in 1995-96, or the 
basic series it is using is different from the 1% 
DSS sample results as published and is very 
erratic with a jump of 0.4 percentage points, 
(equivalent to £180 million), in one year. 
A further point is that the percentage share 
used relates only to those in employment using 
the PAYE system. Although this group 
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accounts for by far the largest share of 
National Insurance contributions, it excludes 
the self-employed and those who pay their 
contributions outwith the PA YE system. It 
cannot be assumed that the distribution of this 
group among the countries in the UK is the 
same as that of the employed. 
Value Added Tax 
Net receipts of value added tax in the UK 
amounted to £46.7 billion in 1996-97. For 
VAT purposes a business normally pays VAT 
at a single geographical location. This location 
is normally the locus of their main accounting 
functions, and may not be the same as the 
place(s) at which their sales are made and 
VAT paid by their customers. It is therefore 
not possible to tell from business's VAT 
returns how much VAT has been paid by 
consumers in any one area. The allocation of 
VAT to different areas is thus necessarily a 
statistical exercise. 
In principle VAT is a tax on consumption by 
end users of goods and services. GERS 
allocates a share of the UK total to Scotland on 
the basis of consumers' expenditure on the 
final goods and services affected by the tax, 
using data from Regional Accounts. This itself 
is based on the Family Expenditure Survey. 
By its nature the FES does not include all 
those small businesses where turnover is too 
small for the firm to be registered for VAT. 
These firms are however end consumers and 
VAT payers. If the distribution of expenditure 
by VAT unregistered businesses differs from 
the distribution of consumers' expenditure, 
then the method of allocation used in GERS 
will be inadequate. 
Corporation Tax 
Corporation tax is assessed on company 
profits. As noted in the GERS report, 
(Appendix B), it is not sensible to allocate the 
tax within the UK where it is collected, since 
many companies have production facilities 
located in different parts of the UK. To get 
round this problem, the Scottish share of UK 
corporation tax, less North Sea corporation 
tax, is allocated in GERS on the basis of 
Scotland's share of UK (less Continental 
Shelf) gross trading profits and surpluses and 
income from self employment, as estimated in 
the Regional Accounts. The share of gross 
trading profits and surpluses was used in 
previous reports but this is no longer published 
separately. 
The GERS methodology results in Scotland 
receiving a 9.2% share of the total of non-oil 
corporation tax collected in the UK. 
There are a number of severe practical 
problems with this approach. These arise 
primarily because the measure used to allocate 
corporation tax in GERS differs significantly 
from the true tax base on which corporation 
tax is assessed. Specific problems are as 
follows: 
1. Corporation tax is paid on company 
profits, but not on income from self-
employment: however, the measure 
on which GERS allocates corporation 
tax includes such income. The 
potential inaccuracy here is large, as 
indicated by the fact that, before 
Regional Accounts stopped 
publishing self employment income 
and gross trading profits separately, 
self employment income was 
estimated to account for 
approximately 40% of the aggregate 
of these two categories. 
2. The relationship between company 
gross trading profits and the tax base 
for corporation tax is not 
straightforward. Companies have 
significant other sources of income 
besides their trading activities (e.g., 
from ownership of financial assets): 
corporation tax is paid on profits 
whether arising from trading or non-
trading activities. Conversely, there 
are significant set-offs against total 
profits before corporation tax is paid: 
for example, relating to capital 
allowances. According to Inland 
Revenue figures, in 1995-96, at the 
UK level, total gross trading profits 
amounted to £170 billion: allowing 
for other sources of income increased 
this to £245 billion: but then taking 
off capital allowances and other 
deductions reduced this to a total 
taxable profit of £106 billion. Given 
the magnitude of these changes, 
simply allocating corporation tax on 
the basis of gross trading profit will 
be subject to significant potential 
error. 
3. There are also specific problems with 
the assessment of gross trading profits 
for banks and financial institutions. 
According to the conventions used in 
the National Accounts, (see UK 
National Accounts, Sources and 
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Methods), receipts of interest are 
regarded as transfer payments. So if a 
bank lends money to a company, in 
national accounting terms the interest 
payment from the company to the 
bank will not be deducted from the 
gross trading profit of the company: 
and it will not be included in the gross 
trading profit of the bank. The interest 
payment will, however, reduce the 
company profits for tax purposes, and 
increase the bank's profit for tax 
purposes. The National Accounts 
definition of Gross Trading Profits, 
therefore, will understate the profits 
of banks and financial institutions for 
the purpose of calculating corporation 
tax. 
4. There are also problems about the 
taxation of life insurance companies. 
From a National Accounts point of 
view, that part of the profits of a life 
insurance company which accrues to 
shareholders is included in company 
profits: while that part which accrues 
to policy holders is allocated to the 
personal sector. Corporation tax, 
however, will be paid on both parts. 
The effect is that, for life insurance 
companies, the National Accounts 
definition of gross trading profits will 
understate the true tax base. The 
effect will be most extreme for mutual 
companies - where the National 
Accounts will allocate the entire 
profit to the personal sector, even 
though such a company will pay 
significant corporation tax. This could 
be important for Scotland, which 
contains a number of large mutuals. 
The above points indicate that there are severe 
difficulties about the GERS approach towards 
allocating Corporation tax to Scodand. It is, 
however, not easy to be constructive about 
how the exercise should be done. The 
difficulties go deeper than lack of data, or the 
fact that National Account conventions are in 
several respects inappropriate from the point 
of view of modelling the tax base. There are 
also underlying philosophical difficulties here: 
in particular, if significant amounts of 
company profits, (and hence corporation tax) 
arise from non-trading activity, what is the 
correct conceptual approach for allocating this 
element of tax? What is clear is that more 
thinking and more work needs to be done in 
this area. 
GERS: EXPENDITURES 
Introduction 
The basic sources for information on 
government expenditure in Scotland is the 
Public Expenditure Survey Analysis (PESA). 
Each year the Treasury carries out a territorial 
exercise, requesting Departments to allocate as 
much as they can of the expenditure within 
their programmes to the country on behalf of 
which the expenditure was incurred. This 
forms Identifiable Expenditure. This and Non-
Identifiable Expenditure comprise all 
expenditures on services. What falls into the 
"Other" category is mainly general 
government debt interest (excluding local 
authority debt interest paid to central 
government) and accounting adjustments to 
put the figures on a consistent basis with 
National Accounts. Identifiable expenditure 
for Scotland is itself split into that within the 
responsibility of Scottish departments, and that 
within the responsibility of omer departments. 
GERS takes the identifiable expenditure 
figures for Scodand as published in PESA. 
The non-identifiable and "other" categories for 
Scotland are estimated, in most cases by taking 
Scotland's GDP or population share. The 
problems we have identified with the GERS 
approach are discussed below: 
1. The broad results of the exercise to 
estimate identifiable expenditure by 
other departments on Scotiand's 
behalf are shown below for 1995-96 
and 1996-97: 
The Treasury notes that the figures 
for the two years are not directly 
comparable in many cases, due to 
changes in the approach used to 
collect the data. The coverage of the 
1996-97 exercise for apportioning 
spending by country was wider, with 
a higher proportion of total 
expenditure being allocated. Where 
departments did not have precise 
accounting information, they were 
asked to use appropriate indicators to 
arrive at an estimate; for example, 
allocation of administration costs in 
the same proportions as die 
corresponding programme 
expenditure. 
There is a lack of information on what 
expenditure is covered in the above 
table, the reasons for changes, and the 
estimation methods used to allocate 
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previously non-identifiable 
expenditure. This is unsatisfactory 
from two points of view: both from 
the point of view of scrutinising 
GERS, and from the point of view of 
the Scottish Parliament attempting to 
exercise its responsibilities in for 
example the area of industry and 
employment. 
Identifiable General Government 
Expenditure by Other Departments 
Expenditure £ 
million: Scotland 
Agriculture fisheries 
food forestry 
The Intervention 
Board 
MAFF 
Trade Industry 
Energy 
Employment 
DfEE 
DTI 
Other 
Transport 
Passenger Rail 
Franchising 
Other 
Other 
Environmental 
Services 
Law Order 
Protective Services 
Crown Office 
Home Office 
Culture Media 
Sport 
Social Security 
1995-96 
2 
2 
145 
111 
33 
1 
47 
47 
8608 
1996-97 
130 
74 
56 
290 
121 
159 
10 
161 
156 
5 
27 
72 
48 
24 
7 
9142 
Source: Letter from HM Treasury 
3. Non-identifiable expenditure for the 
UK is set out in PESA, and is as 
follows: 
Non-Identifiable General Government 
Expenditure 1996-97 
Function 
Defence 
International Development 
Agriculture, fisheries, food, 
forestry 
Trade, Industry, Energy, 
Employment etc. 
Transport 
Housing 
£ million 
21,164 
3,374 
1,261 
2.347 
-374 
Volume 24, No.l, 1998 
Other Environmental Services 
Law, Order, Protective Services 
Education 
Culture, Media, Sport 
Health and Personal Social 
Services 
Social Security 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
144 
7 
16 
142 
1,355 
5,973 
35,407 
In GERS, most of these items are 
allocated to Scotland either on the 
basis of population or GDP share. 
The rationale of this appears to be 
that this is consistent with the overall 
principle of "who benefits", given 
that non-identifiable expenditure is 
generally incurred on behalf of the 
UK as a whole. It is arguable, 
however, that this simple 
interpretation of the "who benefits" 
principle is inadequate. In particular, 
this interpretation fails to take 
account of the different types of 
benefit which arise from government 
expenditure. Specifically, the 
following three categories of benefit 
can be identified: 
• the direct benefit of the service or 
product purchased 
• the employment generated in 
providing the service 
• the multiplier effect on the rest of 
the economy, for example, the 
goods and services which have to 
be purchased from other firms in 
order to provide the service 
The GERS approach only takes the 
first of these into account. We would 
argue that a better approach to the 
"who benefits" principle would 
involve estimating Scotland's share of 
benefit under each of these three 
headings separately for each category 
of non-identifiable expenditure, and 
then deriving a factor as a weighted 
average of the three individual 
factors. This begs the question, of 
course, of the appropriate weights to 
attach: but that, in itself is an issue of 
judgement, which should be explicitly 
addressed, and the subject of debate. 
For several of the major items of 
expenditure, there is evidence to 
suggest that the employment and 
multiplier effects accruing to Scotland 
54 
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are less than Scotland's population or 
GDP share. 
4. Within Other Expenditure at the UK 
level, the largest single item is central 
government debt interest, which 
amounts to £26.6 billion. GERS 
allocates this to Scotland on the basis 
of Scotland's share of non-oil GDP. 
With respect to this allocation, a 
footnote in GERS records that " this 
approach is consistent with that 
adopted in the previous GERS 
reports. However, it could lead to an 
iinderestimate of this component of 
Other Expenditure given that, 
historically, Scotland's share of public 
expenditure has been higher than its 
share of population or GDP". 
This footnote in GERS is very 
significant as an indication that the 
appropriate way to allocate this item 
of expenditure is indeed a topic, 
which could be argued. It would be 
possible to advance the view likewise 
that the correct allocation for 
Scotland should be below its non-oil 
GDP share, given the contribution of 
Scotland's oil revenues to the UK 
exchequer over the past twenty odd 
years. It is not our purpose here to 
advocate either position. The 
important point to note is that the 
appropriate assumption to use is a 
topic for legitimate debate: that this 
debate would have inherently 
political elements: and that the GERS 
approach does not adequately air the 
issues involved. 
EUROPE 
As noted above, the UK's contribution to, and 
receipts from, the European Union is handled 
in the FSBR on a net basis. The way in which 
European transactions come into GERS 
appears to be as follows: 
Within the Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analysis, the UK net contribution to the 
European Union is shown in the 
"miscellaneous" category within non-
identifiable expenditure: in other words this 
published analysis does not allocate this 
category of expenditure to the different parts 
of the UK. The last published GERS report 
allocated this category to Scotland on the basis 
of Scotland's share of non-oil GDP. Applying 
this approach to the PESA figure for 1996-97, 
would imply that the share of the UK net 
contribution allocated to Scotland on the 
GERS methodology would be about £120 
million. 
The other category of expenditure that is 
relevant is expenditure on schemes and 
projects within Scotland directly funded by 
European receipts. The bulk of this 
expenditure is included within the category of 
Identifiable Expenditure for Scotland in PESA, 
but is not separately distinguished from other 
expenditure. It is not, in fact, easy to estimate 
the total of European funded expenditure using 
published sources. On the basis of available 
evidence, we estimate the total of this 
expenditure at about £750 million: but this 
could well be an under estimate. 
As far as can be inferred from the published 
GERS methodology, there is no element of 
European receipts included within the Revenue 
side of GERS. 
At first sight, this implicit treatment of 
European transactions in GERS seems to be 
the direct analogy of the net approach adopted 
at the UK level in the FSBR. There is a term 
(£120 million) which appears to correspond to 
the net contribution implicit in the FSBR: and 
European funded expenditure (which we 
estimate at around £750 million), is simply 
included within the overall total of Scottish 
expenditure. Just as in the FSBR, there is no 
allowance for European receipts on the 
revenue side of the balance sheet. 
But if the GERS treatment of European 
transactions is indeed the direct analogy of the 
FSBR treatment, then the sum of the "net 
contribution" and expenditure on European 
funded projects would equal the gross 
contribution to Europe: this would imply that 
Scotland must be making a gross contribution 
to Europe of £870 million, or over 12% of the 
total UK gross contribution. If correct, this 
would be a startling figure: it would imply that 
Scotland is in fact making a gross contribution 
to Europe which was 50% higher than 
Scotland's GDP share of the UK gross 
contribution, and that the GGBR calculated in 
GERS was being inflated by the requirement 
to fund this gross contribution. If this is indeed 
the government's position, then this represents 
a key assumption underlying the GERS 
methodology which should be stated explicitly 
rather than being buried implicitly in the 
figures. 
It seems most unlikely that this explanation of 
the way European transactions are handled in 
GERS is actually what the government 
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intends. Are there any other possible 
alternatives? 
One possibility is that the government actually 
regards European receipts coming to Scotland 
as being qualitatively different from receipts 
coming to the UK as a whole. At the UK level, 
the alternative gross presentation of the FSBR 
figures would include, on the expenditure side, 
an additional flow equal to the difference 
between the UK's gross and net contribution: 
and on the revenue side, an exactly balancing 
inflow equal to the UK's European receipts. 
The government might argue that neither of 
these notional flows actually exists at the 
Scotland level: and that, in particular, the 
reason that European receipts coming to 
Scotland should not count as revenue in the 
GERS calculation, is because they do not 
represent an external revenue source but are, in 
effect, just revenue which comes from 
Whitehall anyway. 
This position, however, does not look tenable 
either, for the following two reasons: 
• European receipts are not in 
Whitehall's gift: the amount and 
allocation of these funds is 
determined by stringent conditions 
laid down by Brussels and the 
funding should be additional to 
mainstream public expenditure. 
This is the principle of 
additionality. 
• To treat European receipts coming 
to Scotland as an internal revenue 
flow is inconsistent with the 
treatment at UK level. If the UK 
as a whole received £X million 
more European receipts, this 
would increase expenditure on 
European funded projects by £X 
million. At the same time, the 
UK's net contribution to Europe 
would decrease. However, 
because of the workings of the 
Fontainebleau agreement 
governing the rebate which the 
UK receives on its contribution to 
the EU budget, the effect on the 
UK net contribution is not straight 
forward. Let us suppose that the 
effect of the Fontainebleau 
agreement is to reduce the UK 
rebate by a factor (f) of the 
additional receipts the UK has 
received. The overall effect on the 
UK's net contribution to Europe 
of the additional £X million 
receipts is then to change the net 
contribution by an amount (-
X+fX). (Here the factor f will 
vary depending on the type of 
programme involved but will 
typically be a good deal less than 
1). The overall effect on the UK 
borrowing requirement of 
receiving the additional £X 
million EU receipts is to increase 
the borrowing requirement by X 
+ (-X+fX), that is £ fX million 
Now suppose that all of the 
additional £X million came to 
Scotland. The effect of applying 
the GERS methodology is to 
increase Scottish expenditure on 
services by £X million: and to 
change Scotland's "net 
contribution" by Scotland's GDP 
share of the change in the UK net 
contribution: that is, by 0.086(-
X+fX). 
The overall effect on the Scottish 
borrowing requirement is then on 
the GERS methodology, 
X + 0.086 (-X + f X ) 
0.914 X + 0.086 f X 
Since f will normally be materially 
less than 1, the effect is that the 
GERS methodology implies that 
Scotland's borrowing requirement 
increases by a good deal more 
than the UK's borrowing 
requirement. In other words, the 
Scottish and UK approaches are 
inconsistent. 
What seems much more likely than either of 
the above possible rationalisations for the 
treatment of European transactions in GERS is 
that the GERS approach is not tenable. A 
much more reasonable approach would 
involve starting with the gross treatment at UK 
level. A reasonable way of apportioning this 
would then be for Scotland to have, on the 
expenditure side, Scotland's GDP share of the 
UK gross contribution to Europe; on the 
revenue side the actual EU receipts coming to 
Scotland: and on the expenditure side, again, 
the expenditure on projects funded by these 
receipts. The overall contribution of these 
flows to Scotland's GGBR would then be 
Scotland's GDP share of the UK gross 
contribution to Europe. 
In order to move from the way European 
transactions are currently handled in GERS to 
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the more reasonable apportionment of the 
gross flows would involve increasing GERS 
expenditure by Scotland's GDP share of the 
difference between the UK's gross and net 
contribution to Europe, which would amount 
to about £400 million: and increasing GERS 
revenues by Scotland's European receipts 
which we estimate at approximately £750 
million. The effect would be to reduce 
Scotland's apparent borrowing requirement by 
approximately £350 million. 
SUMMARY 
We suggest mat four main conclusions about 
GERS can be drawn from the above analysis. 
1. The results are inherently inaccurate 
and subject to potential bias. This 
arises because, in many cases, the 
required data is not available to 
enable apportionment of revenue 
terms to Scotland to be carried out 
with reasonable accuracy. The type of 
uncertainty which results is different 
from that which can be quantified in 
statistical confidence limits. This is 
particularly the case for income tax, 
VAT and corporation tax, among the 
major revenue items. 
The GERS report indeed notes in its 
Executive Summary that the 
"calculations required to derive a 
GGBR for Scotland are subject to 
imprecision due to the need to 
estimate a number of elements of both 
expenditure and revenue". 
On the basis of the above analysis, the 
extent of the imprecision is 
considerable. 
2. While the detail published in the 
GERS is reasonably full, the same 
cannot be said for some of the key 
input figures, in particular those taken 
from the Public Expenditure 
Statistical Analysis. It is 
unsatisfactory not to know in more 
detail what is included in some of the 
key PESA figures, why the figures 
change from year to year, and what 
estimation techniques have been used. 
3. In some key areas, (e.g., the handling 
of North Sea Oil, European receipts, 
defence expenditure, and central 
government debt interest), the choice 
of different assumptions would 
materially affect the outcome: the 
focus of debate about what the most 
appropriate assumptions should be is 
not primarily statistical but inherently 
involves value judgements. For 
example: how should the "who 
benefits" principle apply to items 
such as non-identifiable expenditure, 
where there is more than one type of 
benefit? What is a fair apportionment 
to Scotland of central government 
debt interest, etc.? These areas need to 
be exposed in the analysis, so that 
they can be the focus of meaningful 
debate. 
4. Given the above identified data 
deficiencies, there is a need for 
considerably unproved data 
collection, if this kind of exercise is to 
be repeated. 
As noted in the introduction, there are two 
possible approaches to a critique of the GERS 
methodology: on the one hand, one could 
focus on the wider philosophical issues; on the 
other, on more practical and technical 
considerations. The substance of this paper has 
concentrated on the latter approach. It is 
worth, however, touching on some of the 
wider philosophical issues before we finish. In 
particular, it is useful to consider the following 
two questions. 
A. Should a GERS type analysis be 
viewed in isolation or should it be 
presented in the context of a wider set 
of indicators? 
B. How relevant are the results of a 
GERS type analysis to different time 
periods or constitutional 
arrangements? 
On the first question, it is relevant that the 
FSBR, as noted above, does not present the 
GGBR calculations for the UK in isolation, but 
presents them as part of a suite of indicators 
covering both the dynamics of the 
government' finances, and aspects such as 
central government debt and public sector 
wealth. This is surely a much more appropriate 
treatment than the snapshot concentration in 
GERS, primarily focused on a single indicator. 
It is our view that, if a GERS type exercise is 
to be attempted, this should only be done if the 
results are indeed set in a wider financial 
context as is done in the FSBR. 
As regards the second question, GERS in itself 
does not purport to be more than a static 
statement, describing a position at a given 
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point in time and conditional upon current 
economic and constitutional circumstances. 
The temptation, however, is for users to take 
the results of this type of analysis and then to 
generalise the implications, either through 
time, or to different possible constitutional 
arrangements. Such a generalisation, however, 
should not be attempted without examining 
how robust the results are likely to be in die 
face of changing circumstances. In particular, 
how robust are the conclusions of GERS likely 
to be in the face of major constitutional 
change? 
It seems to us that the results of a GERS type 
analysis are highly conditional upon specific 
constitutional arrangements, and are therefore 
unlikely to be generalisable in the face of 
constitutional change. There are a number of 
reasons for holding this view: 
1. The pooling of resources at UK level 
is an inherent principle of current UK 
constitutional arrangements. This 
means that there is no consciousness 
at Scotland level that expenditure 
decisions relate to available taxation 
resources. Instead, expenditure 
decisions relate primarily to resources 
made available by current Scottish 
Block arrangements. 
2. The control mechanisms currently 
available to be exercised on taxation 
resources at the Scottish level are 
extremely limited, essentially relating 
only to Council tax. Before 
generalising the conclusions of GERS 
it would be necessary to consider 
what steps might be taken under 
different constitutional arrangements 
to design different tax structures: and 
how, say, an independent Scotland 
might be motivated to use these 
mechanisms. 
3. Similarly, on the expenditure side, it 
would be necessary to consider what 
different mechanisms might apply to 
the control of expenditure, and how 
an independent Scodand might be 
motivated to use these. 
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